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Continuity and change in national parties’ strategies 
of adaptation to European integration
Introduction
How have national parties adapted their strategies of 
competition and behaviour to use, handle, and man-
age the European issue in domestic political competi-
tion? How have different parties within distinct political 
systems adapted their behaviour under the influence of 
European integration over time? In response to these re-
search questions, this article provides a critical review of 
the existing studies and of their arguments in the con-
temporary political science literature. Building on a com-
prehensive review of the existing findings, it attemps to 
outline the key elements of continuity and change in 
the ways national party organisations have strategically 
adapted to the increasing significance of European in-
tegration in West European party systems over the last 
twenty years. This comparative and longitudinal outlook 
enables us to engage in a broader theoretical debate 
and it paves the way to future investigations. 
 The article is structured into three complementary sec-
tions that discuss the findings related to the three main 
dimensions of studies in the literature: while the first sec-
tion reflects upon the strategies of political communica-
tion of national parties over EU matters; the second reas-
sesses the dilemmas they have faced in EU referendums, 
their main strategies for managing intra-party factional-
ism as well as their evolving behaviour in response to the 
consolidation of the European electoral arena. The final 
section introduces a broader normative debate on the 
effects of these strategies of politicisation and depolitici-
sation of EU matters, outlining the centrality of a twofold 
paradox of “distance” and “defiance”.
The strategies of communication over 
Europe of domestic party organisations: 
The stability of the marginalisation and 
the nationalisation of the EU
The literature dealing with political communication on 
EU matters at the national level is dominated by what 
could be conceptualised as the “europeanisation argu-
ment”, that is to say, the broad idea that the visibility of 
MATHIEU PETITHOMME
 Institute of Technology in Besançon, France
Abstract
How have national parties adapted their strategies of competition and behaviour to use, handle, and manage the European issue in do-
mestic political competition? This article outlines the principal elements of continuity and change in the ways national party organisations 
have strategically adapted to the increasing significance of European integration in West European party systems over the last twenty years. 
It contests the arguments of a gradual europeanisation and rising progress of euroscepticism. It shows that the likelihood of politicisation 
over European matters occurring has been very dependent on the arena and the context considered. Few changes have occurred regarding 
the consensual and relatively positive treatment of the European Union (EU) in national newspapers, the very limited saliency of EU-related 
debates in national electoral campaigns and the tendency of mainstream parties to converge rather than diverge on the ways they frame 
the EU. Conflicts over EU matters are not typical, nor are they inherently on the increase: they remain the exception rather than the rule.
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.2, No. 1 Special issue, March 2012
©IdPS
68
ISSN 2039-8573 online
European affairs has gradually increased over the last 
fifteen or twenty years, while EU-related issues would 
have witnessed more and more convergent frames 
across distinct EU members states through transnation-
alisation trends. It is spoken here of a “europeanisation 
argument” because it introduces the notions of gradual 
and convergent processes that would have increasing-
ly fostered the representation of European actors (verti-
cal europeanisation), and of other actors from distinct 
EU member states (horizontal europeanisation) in do-
mestic political debates. European actors or members 
of EU institutions would tend to increasingly partici-
pate in EU-related debates at the national level. It is said 
that these debates would witness increasingly similar 
frames of reference and a growing interconnectedness 
across EU countries. However, although the visibility of 
European affairs has, at times, increased at the national 
level - under certain political conjunctures which have 
fostered more intense debates - generally, EU matters 
have nevertheless remained relatively marginal in do-
mestic politics. While this article would agree that con-
vergent frames have sometimes emerged, in contrast, 
under routine circumstances as well as in general elec-
tion campaigns, it is the stability of distinct “nationally-
grounded” ways of framing the EU that has prevailed, 
while transnationalisation trends have remained mar-
ginal.
The stable marginalisation and low 
visibility of European a!airs
The idea that the visibility of EU affairs has increased 
over time in domestic politics over the past twenty 
years is commonplace in the literature (Van de Steeg 
2002: 499-519; Koopmans 2007: 183-210). From an em-
pirical point of view, it has led several authors to take 
for granted the existence of a European public sphere, 
or to “look for” evidence that confirms its gradual emer-
gence. For example, on the basis of the development 
of the symbols of the EU, such as the Euro, and the gen-
eral positive support for EU membership by the popu-
lations of the distinct EU member states, Michael Bruter 
argues that a “mass European identity” would progres-
sively have emerged (Bruter 2005: 2). However, a clear 
normative bias has prevailed. First, as a consequence of 
the fact that the theoretical and conceptual reflections 
have generally dominated the empirical investigations. 
Second, most political scientists have also preferred a 
“top-down” vision of what a European public sphere 
would entail, rather than developing a bottom-up 
approach. Such alternative perspective would have 
started with empirical and inductive observations, to 
later argue, on the basis of concrete evidence, wheth-
er a process of “europeanisation” of domestic public 
spheres could in fact be observed. As Sophie Duchesne 
has rightly argued: “can we consider that an `imaginary 
European´ exists nowadays: controversial, variable from 
one country to another, and sufficiently constructed 
and present to exercise an influence upon the ways Eu-
ropeans negotiate and act in relation to one another, 
and in relation to the rest of the world? It demands to 
be demonstrated” (Duchesne 2010: 7-16). The idea of 
a “gradual europeanisation of public spheres” is in fact 
contradicted by the lack of longitudinal perspectives, 
that are, undoubtedly, crucial to assess whether some-
thing has changed or not. These limits have been at-
tested compellingly by Risse, who strongly defends this 
“europeanisation” thesis, even though he recognises 
that “the picture for the pre-1995 period remains un-
clear” (Risse 2010: 127-128). 
This lack of a longitudinal perspective also appeared 
in the study of Hans-Jörg Trenz who argued, on the 
basis of the study of eleven daily newspapers from six 
EU member states, that one third of all political news 
contained references to EU issues (Trenz 2004: 291-
319). However, as he focused only on one single year 
(in 2000), his findings might only represent a specific 
conjuncture. Elsewhere, he recognised the dilemma 
between of a “normative overstretch” on the one hand, 
and “empirical disenchantment” on the other hand 
(Trenz 2008). The conclusion that EU actors themselves 
are more visible when the specific issue of EU integra-
tion is framed, or that the more competences the EU 
presents in a given issue arena, the more EU actors are 
referred to in the media, is not especially unsurprising. 
(Koopmans 2007: 183-210). A longitudinal perspective 
is not only necessary, but the increasing visibility (or 
not) of EU affairs also needs to be considered on the ba-
sis of the degree to which national actors themselves, 
and not only European actors, have framed (or not) the 
EU to a greater extent. Wessler and his coauthors found 
that the articles mentioning EU actors have steadily in-
creased between 1982 and 2003, but they also pointed 
out that these have remained relatively marginal by 
comparison to national institutions and actors (Wessler 
et al. 2008: 41). 
Yet, if a common pattern can be delineated regard-
ing the nature of EU-related debates at the national 
level, it can be argued that it is the continuously lim-
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ited visibility of EU institutions and actors that needs to 
be emphasised. National party organisations have not 
framed EU issues to a greater extent in domestic elec-
toral campaigns over the last fifteen years. The extent 
to which EU-related issues might potentially constitute 
a matter of partisan debates in domestic campaigns in 
fact remains strongly influenced by contextual factors, 
and especially by their temporal proximity to EU “grand 
bargains” and Treaty negotiations. Indeed, it can be said 
that the closer domestic elections occur to EU Treaty 
ratifications and the more polarised mainstream par-
ties are on EU matters, the more EU-related debates are 
likely to be salient in national electoral campaigns. 
In some ways, there is nothing new in the fact that gen-
eral elections are still, first and foremost, about national 
politics and that the saliency of EU issues in domestic 
campaigns remains very limited. However, the fact that 
we cannot say, on the basis of concrete empirical evi-
dence, that nowadays there are more debates about 
Europe in national electoral campaigns than there were 
in the early 1990s, is far more surprising and presents 
important theoretical implications. Indeed, it is a clear 
indication that national elites have not contributed to 
foster a “cognitive” turn that might have attenuated the 
real and the imaginary boundaries that continue to se-
clude domestic political spaces and national citizens 
from the EU system of governance. Conversely, it would 
appear that whilst the “institutions” of the EU have 
evolved, the main domestic “interests” and nationally-
oriented “ideas” of domestic elites have remained rela-
tively unchanged, so that they have, arguably, become 
“trapped by their ideas” about Europe (Hassenteufel 
and Surel 2001: 8-24; Schmidt 2007a: 992-1009).
In fact, several other studies also question the thesis of a 
gradual europeanisation of domestic partisan debates. 
A recent study using time series data analysis from 1951 
to 1995 has shown that EU issues mattered very little in 
German quality newspapers (Van de Steeg 2005: 145-
146). If the coverage of the EU has remained fairly limit-
ed in a traditionally pro-EU country, the potential for an 
increasing visibility of the EU in other countries seems 
even more remote. Another investigation of the cover-
age of five EC/EU summits between 1969 and 1991 in 
German, French and British newspapers has suggested 
the importance of “fall and rise”, that is, significant fluctu-
ations in the treatment of the EU: for example, while the 
1991 Maastricht summit received much attention, oth-
er posterior ratifications such as the debates about the 
Treaty of Amsterdam obtained no such visibility (Meyer 
2008: 327-340). Meyer suggests that even though EC/
EU summits are the “masterpieces” of EU politics and 
foster an increased public visibility of the EU, the “Eu-
ropean actuality” still remains marginal in terms of the 
news overall. Another study has also demonstrated 
that “European affairs are not covered routinely”, but 
tend to be given a “fragmented treatment linked with 
the important events of the European institutional ac-
tuality” (Le Torrec and Garcia 2003: 122). Overall, while 
scholars disagree about whether the visibility of the EU 
and European affairs has increased over time, they nev-
ertheless converge, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea 
that domestic actors and nationally-oriented claims still 
dominate importantly. Independently of the normative 
debate related with the actual existence (or not) of a 
European public sphere, most authors do agree that 
‘Europe’ and ‘European integration’ generally remain 
secondary issues for domestic political parties as com-
pared with national matters.
Risse (2010: 118) rightly asserts that “the more European 
and EU issues are reported by comparison to national 
or local issues, the more we could claim a europeanisa-
tion of public spheres”. However, it is rather the continu-
ous marginalisation of EU institutions and actors that 
has prevailed in domestic politics. The treatment of EU 
affairs continues to fluctuate between visible conjunc-
tures surrounding the EU´s ‘great bargains’ and a rela-
tive invisibility under routine periods. Top-down vertical 
claims, characterised by demands from supranational 
actors on domestic actors and institutions, have re-
mained relatively marginal over the last fifteen years in 
domestic political spaces. The public communication of 
EU institutions and actors has continuously been poor-
ly presented in domestic public spheres, demonstrat-
ing little change in that respect, so that it has remained 
a “surrealist communication” characterised by structural 
weaknesses and limits (Dacheux 1994: 159-166).
It is nonetheless true that national parties have adapted 
in a certain way to the development of EU integration, to 
the extent that they have directed a greater proportion 
of their claims towards (and generally against) the EU 
level, and slightly incorporated the “European dimen-
sion” into their national political discourses. These trends 
are interesting in themselves given that they show that 
parties have not been immune to the process of EU in-
tegration. Yet, if the level of analysis is displaced to con-
sider the broader effects of these dynamics of adapta-
tion to the more general ways through which parties 
compete, it can be said that apart from during specific 
and temporarily limited conjunctures, EU issues have 
continuously remained marginalised. Parties have not 
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remained completely “frozen” in their response to the 
development of EU integration, yet it cannot be stated 
that important changes have occurred. Rather, party 
organisations have developed strategies of “conserva-
tive modernisation”, understood as limited adaptations 
and strategic uses of Europe, that have nonetheless led 
them to maintain their broad traditional patterns of 
behaviour (Badie 1992: 48-57; Jacquot and Woll 2004). 
Therefore, it seems clear that contrary to the important 
speculations that dominate the literature, nothing can 
tell us that a greater “europeanisation” of domestic poli-
tics has occurred - or necessarily will occur in the future.
In fact this prospect seems even more unlikely given 
the limits of most of the investigations in this field of 
research, which mainly consider national debates over 
Europe through the lens of domestic newspapers (Erbe 
2005: 75-92; Adam 2007: 409-433). Indeed, it is well-
known that, in practice, most people receive their news 
about the EU from television and tabloids, rather than 
from radios and quality newspapers (Blumler 1983). De 
Vreese et al. have, for instance, emphasised that the 
television coverage of the EU in the weeks prior to the 
1999 and to the 2004 EU elections, was very marginal 
in all EU member states (De Vreese et al. 2006: 477-504). 
Pfetsch et al. have shown that the tabloids in Germany, 
Spain and the Netherlands generally comment on the 
EU even less than quality newspapers, while Peter and 
De Vreese have concluded that the EU remains almost 
entirely absent from television coverage, stating that 
“television has not left the nation-state” (Pfetsch 2008: 
474; Peter and De Vreese 2004: 18). Hence, by focusing 
on quality newspapers rather than on tabloids, TV or ra-
dios coverage, most investigations tend to exaggerate 
the degree to which national public spheres might be 
europeanised (De Vreese and Boomgarden 2003: 361-
381).  
This implies that the very limited, temporally confined 
and spatially secluded europeanisation of national po-
litical debates that can be observed under routine pe-
riods in domestic newspapers and electoral campaigns 
would be even more limited in practice. Even in qual-
ity newspapers, which are arguably read by a limited 
and rather “elitist” public, the absence of europeanised 
debates generally predominates. Risse himself recog-
nises that “if EU affairs are not reported at all, we do not 
need to worry about a European public sphere any fur-
ther” (Risse 2010: 116). Agreeing that a European public 
sphere could theoretically emerge “through the process 
by which people debate controversial issues in public”, 
this study nevertheless questions whether this process 
has taken place up in the EU to date (Risse 2010: 111). 
The visibility of EU institutions and actors, as well as the 
general treatment of European affairs is still relatively 
marginal in domestic public spheres, apart from dur-
ing specific and limited conjunctures. If one considers 
the evolutions at stake from a broad longitudinal per-
spective, it appears that it is the nationalisation of the 
EU and the bottom-up transposition of the nationally-
based visions of domestic actors towards Europe that 
have prevailed, and that continue to do so.
1.2. The myth of transnational Euro-
pean debates
The idea that the discussion of EU-related issues would 
have been characterised by increasingly convergent 
frames and transnational exchanges across EU mem-
ber states is also widespread among those who claim 
an emerging “European identity” (Robyn 2005; Checkel 
2009: 1-25). Fossum and Schlesinger speak, for instance, 
of a European-wide “communicative space in the mak-
ing” (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007: 12). Ulrike Liebert 
also argues that “transnational communication has giv-
en foreign actors a direct voice and has led them to in-
corporate foreign arguments, positive as well as nega-
tive, into national public discourses” (Liebert 2007: 254). 
On the basis of the study of four EU-wide controversies 
(the Haider debate, the ratification of the EU Constitu-
tion, the debates over enlargement and on EU foreign 
and security policies), Risse argues that shared frames 
of reference appeared across the distinct EU member 
states. He concludes that “a community of communica-
tion in the making” can be observed through the grow-
ing interconnectedness between EU-related debates in 
distinct countries (Risse 2010: 139-157). Barbara Berkel 
also argued that a tendency that could be character-
ised by a greater “parallelism” emerged in the news and 
commentary on the Haider conflict in Austrian, British, 
German and French newspapers (Berkel 2006: 85-104).
However, to paraphrase Andy Smith, it seems that 
many scholars have developed an “aerial view” of what 
a public sphere is, leading them to mix the potential 
emergence of a European public sphere (that exists) 
with its actual existence (that does not yet exist) (Smith 
1999: 169-180). Hence, while this study does not deny 
that transnational political debates on EU matters have 
sometimes occurred, it argues that they have remained 
sporadic and fairly limited to specific conjunctures and 
controversies. Risse suggests that the extent of transna-
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tional patterns of communication is attested by the de-
gree to which “national media observe political debates 
and conflicts in fellow European countries” (Risse 2010: 
118). Overall, there is nevertheless little evidence of this 
type of “horizontal europeanisation” linked with trans-
national references to other EU member states. In other 
words, it seems reductive to focus on limited conjunc-
tures only to later argue that transnational exchanges 
over EU matters have progressed. Instead, if one takes 
a broader longitudinal outlook, it appears that transna-
tional communication over EU matters constitutes a 
convenient myth that, nonetheless, remains marginal 
and sporadic. Several recent investigations have ques-
tioned the reality of transnational patterns of commu-
nication over European issues, as well as the idea of a 
“gradual” emergence of transnational communicative 
exchanges (Baisnée 2007: 493-303; Mesnil 2000: 58-75). 
It could even be said that this premise reproduces the 
same dilemma that characterises the neo-functionalist 
theory, as it suggests the existence of a process that 
would progress inherently (Haas 1958). 
Other authors have shown that, to date, it is difficult to 
speak of a greater “transnationalisation” of the debates 
over Europe across EU member states. Focusing on 
Austrian, Danish, French, German and British newspa-
pers, Wessler and his coauthors find, for instance, that 
“Europe” became the object of identification in only 5 
percent of the articles they studied, concluding that a 
“distinctly European discourse involving speakers from 
EU institutions and from other European countries only 
take place in the small number of articles which actu-
ally focus on EU policymaking” (Wessler et al. 2008: 46-
51). While he recognises that “the transnationalisation 
of discourses and its interdiscursivity” are mostly con-
fined to EU actors and national governments, Risse nev-
ertheless concludes that a “transnational and Europe-
an-wide” public sphere would be in the making (Risse 
2010: 170). However, in my view, the fact that the de-
gree of “horizontal” patterns of communication across 
EU member states has remained marginal and limited 
to specific conjunctures constitutes clear evidence of a 
lack of europeanisation and transnationalisation.
1.3. The continuous nationalisation 
of European a!airs
A third point that importantly contradicts the idea of a 
“gradual europeanisation” of domestic political debates 
is the centrality of the nationalisation of EU affairs. In-
deed, it can be said that the debates over European 
integration have remained significantly nationalised in 
Western Europe, a pattern that has not really changed 
over the last twenty years. Another investigation has in 
fact concluded that two thirds of all actors mentioned 
in EU-related claims in British newspapers were national, 
and that only 15 percent were European (Statham and 
Geddes 2006: 248-269). It shows the continuous impor-
tance of nationalised debates, and of the transposition 
at the EU level of context-specific and nationally-based 
visions of the EU (Diez Medrano 2003). The EU contin-
ues to be introduced into national political debates as 
an addressee of proposals and critiques, rather than 
EU actors themselves playing an “active” role by mak-
ing demands. Domestic elites are also more commonly 
inclined to frame “Europe” depending on their national 
views and projects on the EU, or to use the EU level as a 
“blame-shifting” reference point, rather than to present 
and explain EU-related developments to their domestic 
publics (Schmidt 2007b: 270). 
Indeed, studying the media reporting on Eastern en-
largement in five European countries during the 1990s, 
Van de Steeg illustrates that references to a national 
“we” as the predominant focus for investigations have 
been used more frequently than references to a Euro-
pean “we” (Van de Steeg 2005: 125-129). On the basis of 
the analysis of editorials in German, Spanish and Brit-
ish newspapers between 1946 and 1997, Diez Medrano 
illustrated that the German and Spanish treatment of 
the EU was more positive than in Great-Britain, while 
these patterns have been rather stable over time, and 
have not been affected by the evolutions of the rela-
tionships that the respective countries have had with 
the EU (Diez Medrano 2003: 116-153). Oberhuber and 
his coauthors have only found convergent frames on 
constitutional issues, leading them to conclude that 
“within each country a different EU seems to be repre-
sented and different issues are debated” (Oberhuber et 
al. 2005: 263). That is why, contrary to Risse who argued 
that shared “liberal” and “nationalist” frames of reference 
over Europe can be distinguished across countries, this 
study argues that national differences still predomi-
nantly matter in the ways parties apprehend EU inte-
gration. 
Indeed, even though this study agrees that broad simi-
lar “master frames” can sometimes be delineated across 
countries, as Isabelle Guinaudeau and Simon Persico 
have demonstrated for party programmes, it nonethe-
less argues that these frames are not always salient in 
the same ways, while, in addition, they do not follow the 
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same hierarchies across countries, which consequently 
leads them to work in quite different ways (Guinaudeau 
and Persico 2011: 82-105). Thus, from the viewpoint of 
the themes and general judgments associated with EU 
integration, differences across countries arguably still 
prevail over similarities. Even though this article agrees 
that distinct “liberal” and “nationalist” visions of the EU 
can be delineated in each EU member states, what they 
imply strongly differs depending on the context con-
sidered, so that it seems misleading to argue on that 
basis that we would witness a greater convergence of 
europeanised frames. The idea of a “liberal” Europe is, for 
example. associated with completely different notions 
in Great-Britain and France: in the former, it implies a 
“modernisation” of the EU over an unnecessary politi-
cal union, and it is positively related with a common 
market favoured by sovereign states; by contrast, in the 
latter it is negatively perceived as “putting to death” the 
EU, as a triumph of deregulation and economics over 
integration and politics. Even though the theme is sim-
ilar, it is framed in completely different ways on each 
side of the Channel, so that the convergence around 
thematic issues should not so easily taken for granted.
On that point, it has been recently demonstrated that 
the question of Turkish membership to the EU has been 
framed by domestic party actors in French, Belgian, and 
British newspapers between 2004 and 2006 on the basis 
of three dominant “master frames”: enlargement, cultur-
al identity and the Islamic religion. Yet, what is interest-
ing here for our argument on the continuous nation-
alisation of EU affairs, is that while these three themes 
always dominate the treatment of Turkish membership 
in the three different countries, they are nevertheless 
associated with completely distinct types of arguments 
(Petithomme 2010: 60-70). Indeed, the enlargement of 
the EU is positively perceived by the British press so that 
the admission of Turkey, a “periphery at the image of 
Great-Britain”, is globally conceived as a factor of mod-
ernisation of the image of the EU, while it would help 
to contradict the representation of a “Christian Europe” 
and the picture of a “clash of civilisations” with the rest 
of the world (Petithomme 2010: 78). In France, the en-
largement to include Turkey is strongly criticised as a 
symbol of the “dilution of the political character of the 
EU”, so that political actors are generally opposed to 
this “in principle”. In Belgium, the dominant frames are 
more moderately opposed to Turkish membership, to 
the extent that they remain conditional on the deepen-
ing of the political character of the EU: an enlargement 
to Turkey could potentially be accepted, but only if the 
EU would first and foremost progress more decisively 
towards a federal political union (Petithomme 2010: 71-
77). 
The same could be said about the themes of cultural 
identity and Islamic religion that dominate the framing 
of Turkish membership, but operates in different direc-
tions in the three countries: such themes are associated 
with a type of “defiance” against Turkey in France, with 
“suspicion” and conditional arguments in Belgium, and 
with “hope” for better inter-cultural relationships in the 
British press. The way Turkish membership to the EU is 
framed is also dependent upon internal controversies 
in France, on the broader debates on the “political” pro-
ject of the EU in Belgium, and on the general relation-
ships that the country has with the EU in Great-Britain 
(Petithomme 2010: 105-106). Clarifying these elements 
helps to illustrate the idea that even though similar “mas-
ter frames” over Europe can sometimes be found across 
distinct EU member-states, they only emerge sporadi-
cally during controversial EU-related debates, whereas 
overall, the ways party actors apprehend the EU remain 
very dependent on the national variable. That is why, on 
the basis of a broad longitudinal outlook, the idea that 
“national differences in the use of frames recede into 
the background” can be questioned: thus, rather than 
a gradual “europeanisation” and “transnationalisation” of 
domestic public spheres, what seems to prevail is the 
continuous importance of “nationally-based European 
views” (Risse 2010: 119).
Con!ict and polarisation over Eu-
ropean matters:
The prevalence of convergence 
and depoliticisation
Another major argument in the literature could be con-
ceptualised as the “rising euroscepticism” thesis, that is 
to say, the idea that conflict and polarisation over EU 
matters would have progressed over the last twenty 
years. We would witness the end of the “permissive 
consensus” that led political elites to be “able to pursue 
their own policy interests because of public disinter-
est” (Carubba 2001: 141-158). Conflict over EU matters 
would increasingly follow Kantner´s issue cycles criteria, 
in the sense that “the same issues are discussed at the 
same time using the same criteria of relevance” (Kant-
ner 2006: 501-523). “Debating Europe” would increas-
ingly tackle the EU´s democratic deficit, as a first step 
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to democratising the EU (Trenz and Eder 2004: 5-25). 
While this study agrees that conflict and polarisation 
over EU matters have sometimes occurred, it argues 
that they have remained sporadic and contextual rather 
than inherently increasing. Radical parties have periodi-
cally managed to politicise Europe in certain political 
arenas, but they have failed to foster spill-over effects to 
restructure the broader patterns of political exchange. 
At times “Euroscepticism” has upsurged, but it has been 
actively contained by mainstream parties through the 
recurrent reaffirmation of consensual stances towards 
the EU. Three elements are thus considered: the preva-
lence of consensual elite discourses over Europe, the 
ways parties have “compartmentalised” intra-party divi-
sions over Europe, and the twofold behaviour of main-
stream and peripheral opposition parties.
2.1. The prevalence of consensual 
elite discourses over Europe
To begin with, it has been said that conflict and polari-
sation over EU matters have progressed over the last 
fifteen years, given that the same European themes 
would have become increasingly controversial and 
debated at the same time across the distinct domes-
tic public spheres of EU member states. Van de Steeg 
argued for instance that an almost identical issue cycle 
occurred across Europe during the Haider debate (Van 
de Steeg 2006: 609-634). Investigating the treatment of 
the discussions on the “Future of Europe” in six EU coun-
tries, Trenz concluded that the controversies followed 
similar highs and lows (Trenz 2007: 93-95). In a compar-
ative study of the debates on EU enlargement and on 
the EU constitutional project in the German and French 
quality press, Adam nonetheless showed that only the 
treatment of constitutional issues witnessed similar cy-
cles between 2000 and 2002 (Adam 2008: 101-102). In 
fact, the same European themes only seem to be de-
bated at the same time when they relate to constitu-
tional issues or to the “great debates” of EU politics, so 
that over the long term, it is the fluctuating visibility of 
European politics - mirrored by the “highs” and “lows” of 
the European political agenda that has arguably pre-
vailed (Hubé 2003: 69-87).
Indeed, evidences exist showing that conflicts over EU 
matters have sometimes occurred: for example, the 
referendums on the Maastricht Treaty and on the rati-
fication of the ECT have been particularly conflicting in 
France, as well as the referendums on the first Nice Trea-
ty and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. On the basis of the 
case of Great-Britain - where few debates take place on 
European integration as Euroscepticism is shared across 
the party system - it could be said that the more or less 
important saliency of EU matters in domestic elections 
might be related more to the degree of polarisation be-
tween mainstream parties on the EU dimension, than 
to the dominance of negative frames towards the EU. In 
fact, it can be argued that he mobilisation of the “Euro-
pean dimension” by radical parties will have no effect on 
a broader restructuration of political cleavages as long 
as it does not divide mainstream parties (within or be-
tween them). One crucial condition is that mainstream 
parties need to be sufficiently divided and polarised on 
European integration, otherwise it would remain a “va-
lence” and consensual issue that would not affect politi-
cal competition (Budge et al. 2001: 1945-1998).
However, it has also been demonstrated in the literature 
that state actors and especially executive actors belong-
ing to the incumbent party, have generally been better 
represented in national debates over EU issues, while 
MPs, extra-parliamentary actors and other civil society 
actors have remained rather secondary and poorly rep-
resented in domestic debates over Europe. Under rou-
tine periods, mainstream party families have also been 
generally more successful in assuring visibility for their 
claims over Europe, while peripheral parties, whether 
from the extreme-right or the extreme-left, have faced 
more significant difficulties in obtaining a greater vis-
ibility for their claims over Europe. Given that main-
stream parties (with the exception of the British Con-
servatives) generally frame Europe in consensual and 
pro-European ways, pro-EU and office-seeking parties 
are consequently much more represented in EU-related 
debates than peripheral parties under routine periods. 
These elements reinforce the idea that EU integration 
remains an elite-dominated field, while asymmetries of 
powers, both between state and civil society actors on 
the one hand, and mainstream and peripheral parties 
on the other hand, still remain determinant. “European” 
debates at the national level are typically dominated by 
the arguments of one or two individuals from domestic 
executives and mainstream opposition leaders. In fact, 
it could even be said that they rarely take the form of 
“debates” understood as organised controversies, and 
inversely, that they frequently remain limited to con-
sensual, “technical” and disincarnated statements.
That is why, contrary to the thesis of a “rising euroscepti-
cism”, it can be argued that, if one takes a longitudinal 
viewpoint, conflicts over EU matters rarely arise in prac-
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tice: indeed, the general structure of political exchang-
es over EU matters under routine periods has generally 
been dominated by consensually positive claims over 
Europe in Western European party systems. Beyond 
routine periods, the same kind of pattern can arguably 
be delineated during national elections. The national 
variable has importantly contributed and continues to 
play a central role in differentiating the general tones 
of the debates on EU matters across countries. Domes-
tic campaigns have not witnessed a shift towards more 
critiques on Europe over the last fifteen years, but have 
rather been characterised by an interesting stability in 
the types of tones associated with the EU depending 
on the country considered. 
Therefore, in the light of these elements this article ar-
gues that EU integration constitutes a field where the 
consensus between mainstream party elites has re-
mained particularly important, fostering a process that 
has effectively “encapsulated” the potential contesta-
tion of EU matters. Arnaud Mercier defined a public 
sphere as a “symbolic space where the discourses are 
exchanged, most of them contradictory, of the distinct 
social, religious, cultural, and political actors that com-
pose a society” (Mercier 2003: 10). What is interesting 
here is that the application of the notion of a public 
sphere itself to the EU remains relatively questionable, 
to the extent that under routine periods, “Europe” is still 
almost exclusively framed by a very limited set of politi-
cal actors, especially by the incumbent elites of the ex-
ecutive, which themselves generally share consensual 
and rather positive views over the EU. Thus, the politici-
sation of European matters has remained sporadic and 
temporarily limited to specific conjunctures more than 
inherently rising over time, while it has also been ac-
tively confined to certain electoral channels, especially 
through the use of EU referendums.
Internal con"icts within parties: en-
capsulating the politicisation of EU 
matters
The thesis of a “rising euroscepticism” may also be chal-
lenged from the viewpoint of the economy of intra-
party relationships. Indeed, in the specific contexts of 
EU referendums and their aftermaths, the “European 
dimension” has sometimes contributed to question 
the lines over EU integration of certain types of parties 
through their greater likelihood of facing factionalism 
and dissent. Under certain circumstances, EU referen-
dums have contributed to bring about broader de-
bates on EU integration within domestic parties. Here, 
two main elements need to be addressed. On the one 
hand, several studies have suggested that EU-related 
issues generally constitute an engine of dislocation of 
the militant link, in the sense that party leaderships 
tend to search the “blind conformity” of their rank-and-
file members with the official line of their party on the 
EU. The elitist impositions of the lines of the parties on 
the EU arguably reinforce the already existing principle 
of delegation and the primacy of the injunctions to-
wards consensus on EU matters that indirectly foster 
the “self-exclusion” of the party members that hold al-
ternative ideas on the EU. On the other hand, while this 
factor of intra-party frustration can pave the way for an 
internal politicisation of EU matters, party leaderships 
have nevertheless developed active strategies to com-
partmentalise the emergence of such cleavages over 
Europe within their organisations.
Intra-party relationships and the 
continuation of the “permissive con-
sensus”
From the viewpoint of the economy of intra-party re-
lationships, it can be argued that rather than leading 
to an increasing politicisation, under routine periods, 
European integration has, conversely, frequently led to 
the maintenance of a type of “permissive consensus” 
between party elites on the one hand, that have active-
ly controlled the definition of the stances of their or-
ganisations over Europe, and the rest of party members 
on the other hand (Lindberg and Scheingold 1963). 
More than the rise of an increasing contestation of the 
EU within domestic party organisations, this study ar-
gues that, overall, it is the “confinement” of EU-related 
debates to party elites that has prevailed. Debates over 
European matters have only rarely emerged, and when 
they have, only to a fairly limited extent, yet even in 
these cases, the legitimacy of party militants and of sec-
ondary party figures to defend their alternative views 
on the EU has been frequently questioned by the elites, 
illustrating clear distinctions between the preferences 
of the party leaderships and rank-and-file members.
Indeed, it could be said that the “permissive consensus” 
is far from obsolete from the perspective of intra-party 
dynamics: for instance, the leaderships of several main-
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stream opposition parties which have been significantly 
divided over European matters, have actively reinforced 
their autonomies by defining the lines of their parties 
over Europe in the aftermath of EU referendums. The 
convocation of internal debates or referendums on Eu-
ropean matters, as well as the broad usages of “delibera-
tive democracy”, while fostering internal deliberations, 
have nonetheless often been conceived by the elites as 
procedures of ratification of their own views through 
a careful planning of the contest agenda (Le Goff and 
Girard 2011). These procedures have often remained 
very instrumental for reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
party direction, or to solve a situation of internal crisis, 
rather than being used exclusively to decide (demo-
cratically) the party’s line on the EU. This kind of persis-
tent “permissive consensus” and self-exclusion of party 
militants from potential discussions on EU matters can 
be explained by three factors related to the relative in-
difference of militants, as well as to the autonomy and 
pragmatism of party elites.
The first element – illustrating that under routine peri-
ods the indifference of militants has arguably prevailed 
over a manifest euroscepticism – is constituted, in anal-
ogy with ordinary citizens, by a twofold sense of “dis-
tance and complexity” that has dominated their rela-
tively “impossible appropriation” of the EU (Duchesne 
and Van Ingelgom 2008: 143-164; Roger 2007: 37-53). 
Indeed, the perception of the technical nature of Euro-
pean issues and the weak publicity around EU regula-
tions has arguably reinforced a process of self-exclusion 
of party militants from the potential discussions on EU 
issues, as a result of a perceived lack of competence. 
In a certain way, the objective and subjective distance 
from the European centres of power, perpetuates the 
reproduction of a certain indifference and “militant pas-
sivity” under routine periods, that tend to contradict the 
idea that EU issues have increasingly become matters 
of contention within party organisations: most of the 
time, party elites have (in practice) obtained a legiti-
macy, by default, in the choice of the European line of 
their parties through a persistent “permissive consen-
sus”. Consequently, the autonomy that is granted to 
party elites in the definition of the European lines of 
their parties frequently constitutes a privileged way for 
party militants to “reduce the complexity” associated 
with the European integration process by trusting their 
directions with these issues, which then obtain an “au-
tonomy by default” (Caprara 2007: 151-164).
The second element is the general interest of party 
elites in maintaining within the leaderships the discus-
sion and the definition of the lines over Europe of their 
respective organisations, in order to preserve their au-
tonomies, to maintain the centrality of the principle of 
delegation and their important margins of manoeuver 
in European decision-making processes. This has also 
been interestingly considered by Guillaume Dusei-
gneur who illustrated, in a study of the internal deliber-
ations over Europe of Swedish parties, that EU issues are 
not generally evoked during party congresses because 
party elites consider that those conjunctures have to 
constitute “moments of internal communion” and of 
ratification of the overall orientations of the party, rather 
than to provide conjunctures that would foster internal 
debates on issues that are judged to be “too technical” 
(Duseigneur 2011: 10). In practice, EU integration con-
tinues to be treated as an “external” issue and a matter 
of international relations, so that only a limited group of 
a “happy few” maintains its monopoly on how Europe 
should be perceived and framed (Duseigneur 2011: 10). 
This example clearly highlights how the leadership has 
sequenced its discourse to preserve its autonomy and 
to reaffirm its pro-EU line. It can finally be said that this 
type of “stratarchy” applies both to the relationships 
that party leaderships entertain with their rank-and-
file members, and to the links between the actors in-
volved in decision-making processes at the EU level, 
and the other domestic parties and party actors whose 
activities remain confined at the domestic level. Rob-
ert Ladrech has emphasised this process of reinforce-
ment of the autonomy of domestic elites, especially for 
the parties that are implicated in government (Ladrech 
2007: 216-218). This autonomy of the executive elites 
involved in EU decision-making processes is also in-
directly reinforced by the relative “illegibility” of MEPs 
within their national political spaces, and by the weak-
ness of domestic parliamentary controls over European 
matters (Costa 2009: 129-155; Grossman and Sauger 
2007: 1117-1134). 
Thirdly, contradicting the idea of a growing contesta-
tion of EU matters within parties, the willingness of 
party elites to compartmentalise the potential debates 
over Europe has appeared quite clearly through the im-
portance of pragmatism in their behaviour. While this 
principle is broadly applicable to conventional political 
life, it can be said that it has particularly applied to the 
definition of the European lines of mainstream parties, 
in the sense that their stances have frequently remained 
intentionally and strategically vague to let party leader-
ships preserve important margins of autonomy. That is 
why most of the time, internal cohesion and consensus 
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are taken for granted by party leaderships and present-
ed as symbols of “coherence” against other formations, 
even though in practice, it is generally the absence of 
debates that prevails. The argument of partisan consen-
sus over EU matters is even further propagated, to the 
extent that it enables parties to present the politicisa-
tion of European issues as “irresponsible”. The fact that 
pro-Europeanism is often taken for granted by party 
leaderships illustrates well the persistence of a type 
of “permissive consensus” within parties. Therefore, it 
could be said that pragmatism and even a “mercenary 
approach towards integration”, as Holmes suggested, 
still constitute principles that guide the ways party 
elites apprehend EU issues (Holmes 2005: 12).
Party leaderships and the “compart-
mentalisation” of EU issues
On the other hand, contradicting the idea of a potential 
progression of internal conflicts over EU matters, party 
leaderships have arguably developed active strategies 
of temporal and spatial “compartmentalisation” of EU 
issues, to avoid or to try to confine the emergence of 
internal divisions on European matters. While enabling 
the parties to maintain their cohesion, such strategies 
have nonetheless directly contributed to the depolitici-
sation of EU-related debates within party organisations. 
Temporal compartmentalisation can be first observed 
through the choice by the leadership of the “European 
moments” within parties, understood as specific con-
junctures when internal debates over Europe have 
been favoured to better contain their potential emer-
gence in other more sensitive political conjunctures. 
It is clear that during conventional and routine politi-
cal periods, European issues are in fact rarely debated 
within parties. Moreover, the precautious choice of the 
electoral calendar by party leaders aims to keep EU is-
sues “under quarantine” (Duseigneur 2005: 74-91).
The temporal compartmentalisation of EU issues also 
expresses itself through the sequencing of the dis-
course of mainstream parties on EU integration, nota-
bly through legitimising “euro-critique” voices during 
certain political conjunctures, while later on reaffirm-
ing the pro-EU consensus, which enables them to op-
timise the pursuit of contradictory political objectives. 
These strategies of sequencing of their discourses over 
Europe do not apply to radical parties given that they 
present a coherent oppositional stance: their attitudes 
of opposition towards the government generally con-
verge with their critiques of the modalities of EU inte-
gration. In practice, the strategies of temporal compart-
mentalisation privileged by the elites take the form of 
a recurrent motto: “let´s discuss this later” (Aylott 2002: 
441-461). Thus, government parties have importantly 
sequenced their discourses on European integration 
over time, alternating between critical postures on the 
one hand, and the reaffirmation of the pro-European 
consensus on the other hand, depending on the pre-
cise “sequences” of the political debate considered.
Furthermore, the “compartmentalisation” of EU issues 
is also expressed through the intermediary of spatial 
logics, the more classical application of which remains 
the tendency to substitute, as far as possible, political 
competition on EU issues with national and even local 
questions. This “nationalisation” of the focus of political 
competition has been recurrently observed by several 
scholars (Hayward and Fallon 2011: 159-173). Pro-EU 
opposition parties have also often downplayed their 
engagements with EU referendum campaigns, choos-
ing strategies of “silent mobilisation” and leaving the ini-
tiative to the government. Moreover, “permanent” cam-
paigns focused on national issues have also constituted 
a powerful engine for the spatial compartmentalisation 
of EU issues, because the debates that are potentially 
associated with “Europe” in the context of EU elections 
and referendums are constantly pushed towards “other 
arenas” of political competition and “other moments” of 
political debates.
Overall, mainstream party leaderships have used rela-
tively similar organisational, intra-personal, ideological, 
and competitive strategies to limit the potential spill-
over effects that the nascent intra-party debates over 
Europe could have engendered on their organisations. 
During referendum campaigns, these parties have tried 
to confine the debates to the direction, while recognis-
ing the rights of dissidents to exercise distinct “voices” 
in parallel with a demand of “loyalty” in order to confine 
them to a type of “cooperative factionalism” (Boucek 
2009: 455-485). Nevertheless, the moral condemnation 
of dissidents has not generally engendered practical 
sanctions, given that party leaderships have preferred 
to present these divergences as symbols of “pluralism”. 
While the leaders of pro-European opposition parties 
necessarily have to compromise personally with the 
defense of the “Yes”, under certain circumstances they 
have also granted freedom of vote to the members and to 
the sympathisers of their parties. Finally, tendencies towards 
procrastination and towards the report of ideological de-
bates on European matters have also been recurrent.
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The twofold behaviour of opposition 
parties over Europe and the tem-
porary displacement of traditional 
cleavages
In addition to the prevalence of consensual elite dis-
courses over Europe and to the containment of internal 
conflicts within parties, another element that has clear-
ly appeared in the literature is related with the twofold 
behaviour of opposition parties over the EU. Such issue 
is crucial as it enables us to explain why convergence 
and depoliticisation over EU integration have generally 
prevailed over conflict and polarisation. The twofold 
behaviour of opposition parties over the EU enables us 
to consider why the politicisation of EU matters has re-
mained very contextual; less linked to the role of radical 
political entrepreneurs than it is usually recognised; and 
significantly dependent on the political arena consid-
ered.
First, the twofold behaviour of opposition parties over 
the EU has appeared in several studies through their 
clearly distinct stances whether under routine peri-
ods, in the context of national elections or in EU ref-
erendums: while mainstream opposition parties have 
almost always taken pro-EU positions, peripheral oppo-
sition parties have remained confined to anti-European 
positions. This has engendered important effects, in the 
sense that the “normal” structures of political competi-
tion have remained characterised by a pro-EU consen-
sus shared within the mainstream, so that peripheral 
opposition parties have faced significant difficulties in 
mobilising the European cleavage and dividing their 
opponents on this issue. On that point, Hooghe and 
Marks argue that EU integration is no longer a “low sa-
lience issue for the general public” while its influence 
on party competition would have increased (Hooghe 
and Marks 2008: 7). They argue that the “closed shops of 
government leaders, interest groups and Commission 
officials have been bypassed as European issues have 
entered party competition” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 
9). It is true that with the ratifications over the Maas-
tricht Treaty in 1992, EU integration has tended to be-
come more contentious.  
However, recent studies also suggest that the salien-
cy of EU issues in general election campaigns has re-
mained very low, and importantly influenced by con-
textual factors (Kriesi 2007: 83-108). Thus, the argument 
that EU issues have become more contested remains 
questionable: one might indeed argue that, ultimately, 
EU matters still remain marginal. Hooghe and Marks 
(2008: 8-9) themselves recognise that “the level of pub-
lic support in 2005 is not much lower than in 1985”. In 
fact, it could be said that the respective positions of 
mainstream parties have not generally been sufficient-
ly divided to allow for peripheral opposition parties to 
mobilise the European cleavage, so that in the end, the 
politicisation of EU issues has remained very depend-
ent on contextual factors and limited to specific politi-
cal conjunctures. 
Second, the twofold behaviour of opposition parties 
also implies that paradoxically, the politicisation of EU 
matters seems to be less linked to the role of peripheral 
opposition parties than is usually suggested. Indeed, it 
is often said that peripheral opposition parties play a 
crucial role in mobilising the tension related to EU in-
tegration (Franklin and Van der Eijk 2007: 189-208). It is 
clear that under certain circumstances, political entre-
preneurs have contested EU issues, but it could also be 
said that this has not always been the case, nor has con-
testation occurred equally in all political arenas. The role 
of political entrepreneurs belonging to radical parties in 
politicising EU integration has arguably been crucial in 
the context of certain EU referendums. Yet, if the thesis 
of a rising euroscepticism would hold, then we would 
expect that these parties would have also contributed 
to politicise EU integration in European as well as in na-
tional elections. However, EU elections have remained 
the paradise of “lost voters” over the last twenty years, 
and have been characterised by increasing abstention 
and popular withdrawal. National elections themselves 
have not globally witnessed more debates on EU af-
fairs, to the extent that the important degrees of con-
vergence between mainstream parties have prevented 
potential conflicts from occurring. Under routine peri-
ods, the anti-EU claims of peripheral opposition parties 
have been much less represented in domestic public 
spheres than is usually recognised. Thus, it could be 
said that the mobilisation of radical eurosceptic parties 
seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for conflicts to emerge over EU matters.
In fact, as Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues have ar-
gued, the contestation of EU integration seems to be 
part and parcel of the broader cleavage transforma-
tion associated with globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 
921-956). EU integration contributes to reverse a pro-
cess of national boundary construction consolidated 
over the centuries, in the sense that it provides exit 
possibilities for individuals who had previously been 
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nationally bound (Bartolini 2005: 116). The progresses 
of the parties that criticise EU integration illustrate the 
strengthening of an anti-globalisation discourse in de-
fense of a preference towards “nationals” and in favour 
of economic protectionism in which the EU dimension 
is melded, rather than expressing “opposition of princi-
ple” to the idea of a united Europe (Kircheimer 1957: 128-
156). Radical right-wing parties might have progressed in 
Europe over the last fifteen years, but they have arguably 
done so as much through the rejection of immigrants, 
Islam, and economic globalisation, than on the basis of 
the mobilisation of the single EU issue (Ivaldi 2004). As 
Peter Mair puts it, few, if any, parties have been exclu-
sively created on the contestation of the EU issue, that 
has played the role of “another stick” reinforcing “an al-
ready existing armoury” based on a broader nationalist 
and anti-globalisation discourse (Mair 2000: 27-51).
Third, another effect of the twofold behaviour of opposi-
tion parties on the EU has also clearly appeared, to the 
extent that while mainstream opposition parties have 
generally maintained their pro-EU stances and tried to 
depoliticise EU matters, peripheral opposition parties 
have been more likely to politicise the European cleav-
age in certain political arenas than in others. Indeed, 
under certain circumstances, EU referendums have 
been more prone to politicisation, while in contrast, the 
saliency of EU issues has remained very low in national 
election campaigns, and mainstream parties have also 
actively downplayed their commitments to EU election 
campaigns. Some national elections have witnessed 
more EU-related debates than others, while the proxim-
ity to EU Treaty ratifications has arguably played an im-
portant role in influencing the saliency of EU matters. 
However, independent of the role played by periph-
eral opposition parties, what seems to be crucial for a 
greater politicisation to occur is that mainstream parties 
also need to be sufficiently divided over EU matters – a 
condition that has rarely occurred. Yet, in the context of 
EU referendums, the dominant party of the opposition 
has generally colluded with incumbent parties on the 
support towards the Treaty at stake. More than ideologi-
cal, institutional, or organisational factors, it is the specific 
party system “situation” that increases the probability of 
intra-party dissent, while this has engendered recurrent 
difficulties for parties to sway supporters to their side. 
Manifesting a pattern of cartelisation on EU issues, this 
explains why under circumstances of intense mobilisa-
tion from peripheral opposition parties, EU referendums 
have sometimes contributed to awaken the “sleeping gi-
ant” that otherwise remains dormant in other contexts.
Conclusion
To conclude, what can it be said regarding the ways 
national parties have adapted their strategies of com-
petition and behaviour to use, handle, and manage 
the European issue in domestic political competition? 
Overall, it can be stated that parties have designed 
different strategies to adapt to European integration. 
First, domestic parties have incorporated “European” 
issues within their political discourses, but it has not 
necessarily led to a greater “europeanisation” of do-
mestic political debates to the extent that dominant 
parties share relatively similar positions on European 
matters. Second, the position of a given party within 
its party system remains a crucial variable to under-
stand whether it is likely to support a greater politici-
zation of European matters (while in the opposition 
or for peripheral parties), or to resist to such politicisa-
tion (while in government). Third, it can be said that 
the likelihood of politicisation occurring has been very 
dependent on the arena and the context considered: 
few conflicts over the EU have occurred in national 
and European elections, but more in EU referendums. 
That is why, it can be said that few changes have oc-
curred over the last fifteen years regarding the con-
sensual and relatively positive treatment of the EU 
in national newspapers, the very limited saliency of 
EU-related debates in national electoral campaigns 
and the tendency of mainstream parties to converge 
rather than diverge on the ways they frame the EU. 
EU issues continue to be treated marginally. Thus, it 
is the structural absence of conflict that prevails over 
the development of a rising eurosecpticism. Conflicts 
over EU matters are not typical, nor are they inherent-
ly on the increase: they remain the exception rather 
than the rule. Politicisation has sometimes occurred, 
but only in specific conjunctures, and in general it has 
faded away fairly quickly, given that the emergent de-
bates on Europe have been actively condemned and 
contained by mainstream parties through distinct 
strategies of confinement. Otherwise, it is the con-
finement of EU matters to certain spatial arenas and 
limited temporal circumstances, and the predomi-
nance of marginalisation and depoliticisation under 
routine periods, which prevails. Therefore, there is still 
a “missing link” in domestic political debates, given 
that EU institutions and actors generally continue 
not to be represented, even though in practice they 
might constitute important factors of change in do-
mestic policy-making.
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